THE SOMALIS ARE A CULTURALLY, linguistically, and religiously
homogeneous people, who are divided along clan lines and sparsely
scattered over a harsh, dry land. There are significant distinctions
among sectors of the population, related in part to variations in
means of livelihood. In the early 1990s, roughly 60 percent of an
estimated population of more than 8.4 million were still nomadic
pastoralists or seminomadic herders, subject to the vicissitudes of
an arid climate. Twenty to 25 percent of the people were cultivators,
most living in the southern half of the country, on or between
Somalia's two major rivers, the Jubba and the Shabeelle. The
remainder were town dwellers, the vast majority of whom resided in
Somalia's capital, Mogadishu.
With the fall of General Mahammad Siad Barre's regime on January
27, 1991, and the ensuing internal warfare that resulted in the
disintegration of the Somali state, patterns of residency changed
dramatically. For instance, the population of Mogadishu, estimated at
500,000 in the mid-1980s, witnessed the influx of thousands of
refugees. As a result, Mogadishu reportedly had about 2 million
inhabitants in early 1992. Throughout the country the civil war,
along with the lawlessness as Siad Barre's regime collapsed and the
absence of functioning governmental and social institutions, produced
a chaotic situation.
Although 95 percent of the population are ethnic Somalis, sharing
a common culture, in traditional society they segmented themselves
into a hierarchical system of patrilineal descent groups, each said
to originate with a single male ancestor. The most comprehensive of
these groups were the six clan-families. Their constituent units were
the clans, which in turn were made up of lineages, which themselves
were further segmented. Among the sedentary interriverine Somalis,
however, descent gave way in part to territoriality as a framework
for social, political, and economic organization.
Membership in clans and lineages shaped the allocation of
individual rights and obligations. The principle of descent, however,
was modified (although rarely overridden) by Somali heer, or
traditional jurisprudence. Contracts or treaties bound specified
descent groups and their individual members together for the making
of war and peace and, above all, for the provision of compensation in
cases of homicide and injury.
The Somali social order has been marked by competition and often
by armed conflict between clans and lineages, even between units of
the same clan-family or clan. Within each unit, Somali males
considered better warriors, wiser arbiters, or abler speakers
commanded greater respect in council. However, pastoral Somalis
looked down on sedentary ones, and both looked down on non-Somali
clients of the sedentary Somalis and members of despised occupational
groups such as hunters and smiths, who made up, however, only a very
small proportion of the population.
The segmented social order, with relatively minor modifications,
was carried into the independence period. In a very poor country,
many Somalis were disaffected by the competition for power and wealth
that often took the form of shifting alliances and conflicts between
greater and lesser clans and lineage segments. Simultaneously, new
cleavages emerged between educated urban dwellers who had mastered a
foreign language and the less-sophisticated rural Somalis.
Soon after the October 1969 military coup, Siad Barre's socialist
government aimed an attack at the traditional system. In principle at
least, his regime reduced the significance of clans and lineages,
encouraged women to participate in government and attend school, and
sanctioned the social equality of lowstatus groups. The gap that had
opened between educated Englishor Italian-speaking Somalis and the
rest of the population was reduced somewhat by the institution of a
Somali script and the designation of Somali as the official language.
Siad Barre's government insisted that socialism was compatible
with Islam, the religion of the overwhelming majority of Somalis.
Although Somalis had not always conformed to the rigors of orthodox
Islam, their identity was bound up with being Muslim. With few, if
any, exceptions leaders of the socialist regime were Muslims and did
not attack religion. However, they also did not hesitate to institute
reforms that displeased conservative Muslim leaders.
Despite government encouragement of change, clan and lineage
remained important throughout Siad Barre's rule, and Siad Barre
remained in power by manipulating clans and clan leaders. In fact,
soon after the revolution, kinship considerations and nepotism were
evident at the highest levels of the regime.
The workings of the lineage system were predicated on the
solidarity of the segments of the same order with one another and the
relative equality of the members of each segment. The growth of the
state and the development of different degrees of wealth and access
to other private-sector resources caused an incipient stratification
that had the potential to override lineage solidarity as it
diminished equality.